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Background
In the real world, agents or entities are in a continuous state of interactions (Niazi et al. 
2011). Examples of these include  the continuously interacting agents in the stock mar-
ket (Bonabeau 2002). These agents and systems can be adaptive in nature and can also  
evolve. Their current behavior can depend on the past so they often learn from history.
The interaction of agents leads to a wide variety of  complexity dynamics (McDaniel 
and Driebe 2001). Complexity arises due to non-linear agent interactions. The behav-
ior of such non-linear systems can be chaotic and unpredictable. Complex adaptive sys-
tems (CAS) in the natural world (Niazi et al. 2011) and complex physical systems (CPS) 
(Winsberg 2001) in man-made systems are examples of such agent interactions.
One key difficulty faced by Complexity researchers is  in the modeling of communi-
cation and complex agent interaction  (Niazi and Hussain 2012). Modern communica-
tion systems are  often composed of hierarchical complex systems. These systems can be 
modeled as multiagent systems  using agent-based modeling (ABM). Modeling CAS and 
CPS using ABM not only allows for prediction of outcomes but also helps in terms of 
gaining an understanding of the complex inter-connnections and interactions  (Epstein 
2008). However, a key issue in such models is   to understand the dynamics of    agent 
interaction. Game Theory offers techniques and tools for modeling communication 
problems among agents.
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Game theory offers a perspective of analysis and modeling of these interactions (Car-
michael 2005). It is a discipline that studies decision making of interactive entities (Dixit 
and Skeath 1999). We can say that strategic thinking is   perhaps  the most recognized 
essence of game theory.
Previously, while a large amount of literature is available on game theory, most of it 
is   focused on specific domains like Biology, Economics, and Computer Science (Sho-
ham and Leyton-Brown 2008). Game theory  has also been used in business to model 
interactions of stakeholders etc.
To the best of our knowledge, there is an absence of a state-of-the-art reviews  of game 
theoretical literature from the agent-based modeling perspective. This paper presents a 
comprehensive review of game theory models and their applications. Additionally, a tax-
onomy of classes of games is also presented.
The paper is organized as follows: first, we give an overview of game theory and pre-
sent a taxonomy of games. This is followed by literature review in the next section. Then,  
in the discussion we classify games and discuss open problems before concluding the 
paper.
Game theory overview
While the essence of game theory has perhaps practically applied itself since life pre-
sented itself on this planet, formal literature on the topic can be traced back to the work 
of Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). They worked on zero-sum games. Then in 
the 1950s, Nash’s work resulted in significant advancement  of this field (Nash 1950). 
Subsequently, Game theory has   since  been used in many different fields like biology 
(Hofbauer and Sigmund 1998), politics and other domains (Morrow 1994).
Game theory presents a technical analysis of strategic interactions (Shoham and Ley-
ton-Brown 2008). These strategic interactions are concerned with the interaction of 
decision makers in the game (Geckil and Anderson 2009). The behavior of a decision 
maker in game theory models is called “strategic” and the action performed while mak-
ing any move is called a “strategy”. Strategy considers how agents act, what they pre-
fer, how they make their decisions,   and their behaviors etc. These interactions can be 
complex as the action of even a single  agent can influence other agents and vice versa. 
Game theory can thus be considered as a powerful tool to model and understand com-
plex interactions.
One way of classifying game theory models is to divide them  into cooperative and 
non-cooperative games (Shoham and Leyton-Brown 2008). In cooperative games, we 
focus  on a set of agents. Whereas, in non-cooperative games the focus is on the devel-
opment of models of  interactions, preferences, and so on,   with a focus on individual 
agents.1 It can model different types of games including zero-sum (Shoham and Leyton-
Brown 2008), stochastic (Mertens and Neyman 1981), repeated Aumann and Maschler 
(game of fairness as if player cuts unequ), Bayesian (Böge and Eisele 1979) and conges-
tion (Rosenthal 1973).
1 Literature usually considers cooperative and non-cooperative as conflicting and non-conflicting game theory. But we 
are following definition of Shoham et al. that cooperative game theory focus on modeling set of players and non-cooper-
ative models individual player (Shoham and Leyton-Brown 2008).
Page 3 of 31Farooqui and Niazi  Complex Adapt Syst Model  (2016) 4:13 
Multidisciplinary nature of game theory
Game theory can be seen everywhere in   living systems, in general, and human soci-
ety, in particular. In personal life as well as in professional life, every day we are faced 
with decisions which often can be simplified using game theory. There are different areas 
where game theory  has been applied such as Economics, Politics etc.
(Shoham and Leyton-Brown 2008). Algorithmic game theory is an example of applica-
tion in computer science (Roughgarden 2010). Biologists have used it to learn species 
behaviors (Hofbauer and Sigmund 1998). In mathematics, there   is a complete branch 
that studies decision-making process (Mazalov 2014). It also has its influences in busi-
ness (Geckil and Anderson 2009). It can model interactions of stakeholders, dynamics in 
interest rates etc.
Dixit and Skeath (1999) note that we can use game theory mainly in three ways that 
are an explanation, prediction, and prescription.
Explanation
Game theory can be used to explain insights of a situation like why that happened, what 
were the causes, Effects of that happening etc. We can do a complete case study by using 
game theory.
Prediction
Game theory studies decision makers (autonomous agents) that have actions to take, 
preferences that what they want, different options which they can choose etc. By analyz-
ing these actions, preferences, options etc we can predict different moves of agents on 
different types of situation.
Prescription
If we can analyze agent actions, strategies etc to predict its moves, then we can definitely 
give advice about different moves to agents. It means we can provide a sophisticated 
model for future decision-makings.
Now let us consider basic concepts of game theory.
Basic concepts
Dixit and Nalebuff (1993) have defined Game theory as:
Definition 1 The branch of social science that studies strategic decision-making.
Another definition is by Hutton (1996):
Definition 2 An intellectual framework for examining what various parties to a deci-
sion should do given their possession of inadequate information and different objectives.
Shoham and Leyton-Brown (2008) have defined game theory as:
Definition 3 Game theory is the mathematical study of interaction among independ-
ent, self-interested agents.
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In the oxford dictionary, self-interested means self-seeking or self-serving. Anyone 
who is self-interested is concerned strongly with own interests. This seems selfishness of 
someone who do not consider others interests.
However, in game theory, these are actually intelligent agents and their behavior is 
based on artificial intelligence models (Wooldridge 2009). These are autonomous enti-
ties, with their own description of world states and they behave accordingly (Shoham 
and Leyton-Brown 2008). Unfortunately, there is no universal definition of the agent but 
autonomy is one of the basic properties of the agent.
In Computer Science, Algorithmic game theory is used (Roughgarden 2010). It com-
bines game theory together with computer science. It focuses on creating algorithms for 
strategic interactions, calculating Nash equilibrium etc.
Game
Carmichael (2005) has defined games as:
Definition 4 A scenario or situation where for two or more individuals, their choice of 
action or behavior has an impact on the other (or others).
The game consists of several things such as
  • players
  • strategies (actions taken while interactions)
  • payoffs (utilities gained)
  • payoff function (calculates utility against each strategy)
  • and of course, game rules.
Geckil and Anderson (2009) has defined game as:
Definition 5 A game-theoretic model is an environment where each decision maker’s 
actions interact with those of others
Game representation
There are mainly two ways to represent the game. Normal-form is simply a matrix that 
describes strategies and payoffs of the games (Morrow 1994). Another representation is 
extensive-form, which is a tree-like structure (Morrow 1994). Extensive-form contains 
more information than normal-form like a sequence of player moves. However, there are 
games that require richer representation such as infinite repeated games. To represent 
such games we have Beyond Normal-Extensive form (Shoham and Leyton-Brown 2008).
Decision theorem
Game theory has two decision theorems known as maximin and minimax (Mazalov 
2014). The minimax theorem minimizes the loss of a player. The maximin theorem used 
to maximize the benefit gain by the player.
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Games taxonomy
We saw different types of games in the literature review. These games were presented 
using three types of game representations. Normal-form, extensive-form and beyond 
normal and extensive-form games (Shoham and Leyton-Brown 2008). We proposed a 
taxonomy of games based on these three game representation types. See Fig. 1.
The taxonomy mainly classifies games into three types, as there are three types of 
representations. Then it further classifies games that are included in both normal-form 
games and extensive-form games. Games included in both because a normal-form 
representation can be derived from extensive-form games. Beyond normal and exten-
sive form includes those games that need richer representation. These games can be 
infinite and undetermined. Therefore, that it is difficult to represent them in first two 
representations.
These games have been discussed in literature according to game representation types 
but is not presented as the taxonomy in this paper demonstrates. There are previously 
given taxonomies, but these are specific to the two-player game. Kilgour and Fraser have 
presented a taxonomy discussing ordinal games (Kilgour and Fraser 1988). Rapoport and 
Guyer (1978) have presented another taxonomy considering 2 × 2 games. The taxonomy 
given in this paper is not specific and is based on the type of game representation.
Normal‑form games
It is conceptually straightforward strategic representation (Morrow 1994). It describes 
all observable and possible strategies and the utility against each strategy. It can repre-
sent all finite games and taken as a universal representation of games. It uses a matrix to 
represent strategic interactions of players in a matrix form. It consists of
Fig. 1 Taxonomy of games. Games can be classified into three classes: games in normal form, games in 
extensive form and games in beyond normal and extensive form. Normal and extensive form games are fur-
ther divided into zero-sum, non-zero-sum, perfect information, imperfect information games. Beyond normal 
and extensive form games are further divided into repeated, stochastic, Bayesian and congestion games. 
Finally repeated games are further divided into finite repeated games and infinite repeated games
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  • Set of players
  • Strategy space, a set of all strategies of a player
  • Payoff function, it calculates the utility against each strategy.
Table 1 adapted from Morrow (1994) shows a normal form representation of Matching 
Pennies game. If both P1 and P2 get heads, P1 will take both coins else P2 will win and 
take both coins. The numbers 1 and −1 shows the utility gained or loosed by players.
Extensive‑form games
It is an alternative way of representing games in a tree-like structure. It defines differ-
ent stages of the game. Moves, choices, and actions defined according to each stage. We 
can derive a normal-form representation from extensive representation. Morrow (1994) 
described Matching pennies game in extensive form representation. See Fig. 2.
Beyond normal/extensive games
There are games needs richer representation like repeated games (Shoham and Leyton-
Brown 2008). These can be finite or infinite. Therefore, that it is difficult to represent 
them in normal/extensive forms. The games included here are.
  • Repeated games: These are also called stage games. Players play these games multiple 
times (Aumann and Maschler 1995).
  • Stochastic games: These are also called Markov games. There are stages in the game. 
Every stage represents the state of a game from a finite set of game states. The player 
has a set of actions that consists of many finite actions (Mertens and Neyman 1981).
  • Bayesian games: These are games of incomplete information. Players select their 
strategies according to Bayes’ Rule (Böge and Eisele 1979).
  • Congestion games: These games are the class of non-conflicting games (Rosenthal 
1973). In these games, all the players have same strategy set. The result of every 
player relies upon the strategy it picks and all other players picking the same strategy.
Complex adaptive systems
Complex systems have special types of systems known as Complex adaptive systems 
(Mitchell 2009). These systems have the dynamic environment and non-linear interaction 
of components. The amazing thing for researchers is that these systems are composed 
of so simple components and exhibits emergent behavior when combined together. Such 
systems can be understood only by considering all components collectively.
Table 1 Matching pennies: game in  normal-form (This table is adapted from Morrow 
(1994))
In this game if both players show same side of coins that is both shows head or tail then P1 wins and P2 looses both coins. If 
both players shows different sides then P2 wins and P1 looses both coins
P1 P2
H T
H (1, −1) (−1, 1)
T (−1, 1) (1, −1)
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Nonlinear agent interaction
Complex adaptive systems are subset of dynamic non-linear system (McDaniel and 
Driebe 2001). In non-linear agent interactions, the inputs are inversely proportional 
to output (Lansing 2003). In these amazing systems, small changes can results in a big 
change and vice versa. Mathematically, the behavior of the non-linear system can be 
described as non-linear polynomial equations.
There can be more than one attracters in non-linear systems (Socolar 2006). These 
attractors are of different types with complicated limit cycles. The trajectories are 
restricted to areas that have unstable limit cycles.
Agent‑based computing
Agent-based computing is a wide domain (Niazi and Hussain 2011). The agent here can 
simply a software providing any service. Or it can be fully autonomous agent whose 
behavior based on artificial intelligence. Agent-based computing should not be confused 
with other terms in artificial intelligence. Such terms are agent-oriented programming, 
multi-agent oriented programming, and agent-based modeling. These all are actually 
collected together in agent-based computing.
Now in the next section, we will present a review on available game theoretic literature.
Review
In the previous section, we gave an overview of game theory and presented a taxonomy 
of games. In this section, we will explore available game theoretic literature.
Zero‑sum game theoretic models
Zero-sum games are the mathematical representation of conflicting situations (Wash-
burn 2003). In these games, the total of gains and losses is equal to zero. Application of 
Fig. 2 The boxes represent the player currently playing and the number 1 represents player 1 and number 2 
represents player 2. The tree shows that player 1 can show head or tail. Next player 2 has turn who can show 
head or tail against player 1 options. Finally in parenthesis the payoffs are shown according to each option of 
players. This figure is adapted from Morrow (1994)
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these game theoretic models can be seen in different fields like network security (Perea 
and Puerto 2013) and resource allocation (Zhou et  al. 2011). There are also different 
types of games. Such as zero-sum games with incomplete information and large Zero-
sum games.
Al-Tamimi et al. (2007) have discussed Q-learning designs for the zero-sum game. By 
using a model-free approach they obtained a solution for the game. Autopilot design for 
the F-16 plane is performed that shows productiveness of method.
Daskalakis et al. (2015) have proposed no-regret algorithm. This zero-sum game theo-
retic algorithm achieves regret when applying against an adversary. After using the algo-
rithm, quadratic improvement can be identified on convergence rate to game value. The 
lower bound for all distributed dynamics is optimal. This happens when payoff matrix 
information is unknown to both players. But if they know they can compute minimax 
strategies privately.
Bopardikar et al. (2013) have studied larger zero-sum games. In these games, players 
have a large number of options. It proposes two algorithms. The Sampled Security Policy 
algorithm is to compute optimal policies. Then Sampled Security Value algorithm com-
putes the level of confidence on the given policy.
Moulin and Vial (1978) have proposed a class of games called strategically zero-sum 
games. These games have special payoff structure. The mixed equilibrium of these games 
cannot be improved. The properties of games via a large body of correlation scheme is 
also described.
Sorin (2011) have worked on repeated zero-sum games. They described current 
advancement in these games especially together with differential games. They first define 
models of repeated games and differential games. Then they discuss issues related to 
these models.
Seo and Lee (2007) have considered conflicting zero-sum game that involves decision-
making process. This is an experimental study on trained monkeys. Monkeys take binary 
choices in the computer-simulated conflicting game. The study described the decision-
making process adaptive in both human and animals.
Zoroa et  al. (2012) have modeled a perimeter patrol problem. They used Zero-sum 
discrete search games as a framework for their study. They studied problem occurred 
in cylindrical surface. The problem in the linear set having cyclic order is also studied. 
Optimal strategies are found via computer code.
Xu and Mizukami (1994) have studied systems of state space. They obtained saddle-
point by a constructive method. It describes that there can be several saddle-point solu-
tions for the system. When several saddle-points exist, this universal system differs from 
the state space system. They found possible conditions for the existence of saddle-point.
Ponssard and Sorin (1980) have discussed zero-sum games with incomplete informa-
tion. They discussed two ways to determine information of states. It can be obtained via 
independent chance moves or the unique one. Unique moves cause dependence in state 
information. Thus, it is complicated to analyze. Several results acquired in the independ-
ent case have their equivalent in dependent one.
Chen and Larbani (2006) have proposed undetermined utility matrix game. They 
worked for the solution of decision-making problem (MADM). This decision making 
deals with prioritization of alternatives considering several attributes. Here weights of an 
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MADM problem obtained with a fuzzy decision matrix. Finally, equilibrium solution is 
also obtained.
Li and Cruz (2009) have studied deception. They used a zero-sum game model with 
an asymmetrical structure. This paper considers the relationship between information 
and decision-making to understand deception. In these games, the first player gets extra 
information. Whereas the second player has the power to inject deception. The paper 
also classifies deception into active deception and passive deception.
Ponssard (1975) have worked on the zero-sum game in the normal form. They 
described that these games are equal to a linear program (LP). In these games, the play-
er’s behavioral strategies are represented in variables. In normal form game variables are 
used to represent the player’s mixed strategies.
Wang and Chen (2013) have obtained feedback saddle-point for the zero-sum differ-
ential game. The game is between counter-terror measure and economic growth. It uses 
Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaac’s equation to obtain saddle-point. The saddle-point obtained, 
strengthens the government counter-terror and weakens the terrorist organizations.
Van Zandt and Zhang (2011) have studied equilibrium value for Bayesian zero-sum 
games. The conditions are characterized for equilibrium value and strategies. These 
games have a parameter to obtain payoff function and strategies for every player. The 
information of every player is modeled as a sub- σ -field to obtain optimal strategies.
Marlow and Peart (2014) have studied soil acidification. They described a zero-sum 
game between a sugar maple and American beech. The negative impact of soil acidifica-
tion on sugar maple supports beech in the game. The model lay down the findings of this 
study and other evidence of soil acidification. The results suggest re-examining the cost-
effectiveness of chemical remediation.
2‑player zero‑sum games
Mertens and Zamir (1971) have also discussed the two-person zero-sum game with 
incomplete information. These games are studied in a repetitive form. As a result, the 
game value is obtained with n repetitions. This is previously discussed by Harsanyi. 
However, still this paper is completely independent on its own.
Chang and Marcus (2003) have studied two-person zero-sum game. They considered 
optimal equilibrium game value and then analyzed error bounds. After that, they dis-
cussed methods that calculate the value of subgame.
Méndez-Naya (1996) have discussed 2-players continuous games. These games have 
set of pure strategies. These games also have right-sided semi-open real intervals and 
continuous payoff functions. The paper described conditions for game value in the 
mixed game. It is proved that there is no assurance that mixed extended Zero-sum game 
has a value but there can be a value.
Qing-Lai et al. (2009) have proposed an algorithm for 2-D systems. It solves two-play-
ers zero-sum games. It obtains saddle-point by using adaptive critic technique. The opti-
mal control policies have been computed using neural networks. The algorithm can be 
implemented without system model.
Zhang et al. (2011) have proposed an iterative algorithm. It obtains optimal solutions 
for the non-affine nonlinear zero-sum game. This is a two-player game with quadratic 
performance index. One player minimizes the performance index while other maximizes 
Page 10 of 31Farooqui and Niazi  Complex Adapt Syst Model  (2016) 4:13 
it. This study held to facilitate this minimax problem. The optimal strategy has obtained 
an order of state trajectories and Riccati differential equations. Finally, the simulation 
shows successful results of this iterative method.
Gensbittel (2014) has worked on zero-sum incomplete information games. The author 
extended the CAV (U) Theorem of Aumaan–Maschler (Aumann et  al. 1995). In this 
paper, the presented results are for infinite repeated games. Finally, the paper provides 
optimal strategies for players in 2-players game having length n.
Bettiol et  al. (2006) have considered Zero-sum state constrained differential games. 
The study proves bolza problem for two-player differential games. It shows that lower 
semi-continuous value function exists in differential games. The optimal strategy is cre-
ated and the value function is characterized by viscosity solutions.
Beyond 2‑player zero‑sum games
Initially, the zero-sum game is a 2-player game (Von Neumann and Morgenstern 1953). 
In which one player has to win and other has to loose the game. The following papers 
show that researchers have worked on beyond 2-player game.
Moulin (1976) has worked on beyond 2-player Zero-sum games. First, this study 
describes a large family of abstract extension. Then these extensions are classified based 
on information exchanged. Finally, characterization of all possible values gained from 
this abstract extension is described.
Okamura et  al. (1984) have studied three-player zero-sum games. They investigated 
the learning of the behavior of variable-structure stochastic automata in a game. These 
automata have learning capabilities and can update their actions. The players have a lack 
of information of payoff matrix. After every play, the environment, responds to automa-
ton actions. After this, players update their strategies.
Decision theorems
Sauder and Geraniotis (1994) have worked on maximin and minimax theorems. They 
formulated signal detection process as two-players zero-sum game. The two-players are 
the detector designer and the signal designer. The signal detection problem arises when 
analyzing the signal is genuine or deceptive. Finally, results are validated via simulation.
Hellman (2013) have focused on rational belief system. The study got the basis from 
the work of Aumann and Dreze. They described that players have common knowledge of 
rationality. Whereas in this article, it is argued that there is no need of common rational-
ity. Finally, it is shown that the expected payoff in the game is only the minimax value.
Ponssard (1976) have discussed minimax strategies. These are prohibited to give par-
ticular solutions in optimal zero-sum game play. This study finds a strategy to be used 
after the mistake carries out in play. There are two approaches proposed to get opti-
mal strategies. The first approach arrived from perturbed games. The second approach 
established on the basis of the lexicographic application. If the opponent ignores mis-
takes, the strategy will remain optimal as it does not turn to give a loss.
Gawlitza et al. (2012) have proposed two strategy improvement algorithms for static 
program analysis. One is max-strategy and the other is min-strategy for static program 
analysis. These algorithms perform within a common general framework to solve v-cam 
cave equations.
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Rock paper scissors
Rock paper scissors (RPS) is a cyclic game with three strategies. See Fig. 3. The game is 
2-players zero-sum. The game rules are rock wins over scissors, scissors over paper and 
paper over rock. Following papers considers RPS game theoretic model.
Sinervo and Lively (1996) have used cyclic RPS game in a biological study. By using 
this zero-sum model they studied three different strategies of male side-blotch lizards. It 
studies territory use and patterns of sexual selection on male side-blotch lizards.
Bahel and Haller (2013) have computed Nash equilibria of cyclic RPS game. They 
characterized Nash equilibria into two sets. With an even number of actions, an infinity 
of Nash equilibria exists. On the second set with an odd number of actions unique Nash 
equilibria is found. This paper studies the strength of Nash equilibria.
Frey et al. (2013) have studied complex dynamics in social and economic systems. This 
is realized by analyzing agents independently playing a multiplayer mod game. The game 
is like the rock paper scissors. The behavior of players in human groups is non-fluctuat-
ing and effective. In this game the periodic behavior is stable.
Batt (1999) has   also studied the model of Rock Paper Scissors game  and    has pre-
sented  insights of the game having an efficient outcome with few conflicts. The game 
players are biased for being a winner. This game is not efficient with major conflicts. For 
that other approaches like coin-flip is the best choice.
Neumann and Schuster (2007) have used a zero-sum rock scissor paper game as a 
framework. By which they modeled the process of bacteriocin producing bacteria. The 
game is examined for three strains. These are of E. coli, bacteriocin producer, resistant 
and sensitive. They derived stability criteria for these strains. The paper actually pro-
poses Lotka–Volterra system model of the RPS game.
Duersch et  al. (2012) have obtained Nash equilibrium for the 2-player symmetric 
game. There is no pure equilibrium exists in RPS game. They found that pure equilib-
rium strategy exists only in non-generalized rock paper scissors game. It also showed 
that pure equilibrium exists for the 2-player finite symmetric game.
Cake cutting
Cake cutting is a simple child game. See Fig. 4. In this game, the first player has to cut the 
cake and then the second player has to choose the piece. The first player has to cut pieces 
Fig. 3 Rock paper scissors is a three strategic 2-player game. According to game rules rock beats scissors, 
scissors beat paper and paper beats rock. The game will draw if both players show same options
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equally. Otherwise, the second player has the choice to choose either the bigger piece or 
the smaller one. This is to accomplish honesty in the game.
Procaccia (2013) have discussed cake cutting game. They described that it is a power-
ful tool to divide heterogeneous goods and resources. Cake cutting algorithm looks for 
formal fairness in the division of heterogeneous divisible goods. But the design of these 
algorithms is a complex task for computer scientists.
Edmonds and Pruhs (2006) have proposed a randomized algorithm that considers 
cake cutting algorithm. It equally allocates resources between n numbers of players. This 
algorithm needs honesty of players.
Matching penny
Matching penny is also a zero-sum 2-player game. Both players secretly turn their coins 
and then compare with each other. If both are heads or tails then the first player will win 
else player 2 will win both coins. See Fig. 5.
McCabe et al. (2000) have studied three-person matching pennies game. It examines 
knowledge of player about other player’s payoffs and actions. The Naive Bayesian learn-
ing and sophisticated Bayesian learning are studied in this context. These approaches 
examine that estimated mixed strategies can be played or not. Results showed that play-
ers do not use sophisticated Bayesian learning to obtain Nash equilibrium.
Stein et  al. (2010) have studied mixed extension of matching pennies, a zero-sum 
game. This study constructs examples to support polynomial games. Here Nash equilib-
ria are representable as finitely moments. Whereas polynomial games cannot be repre-
sented as finitely moments.
Colonel Blotto
Colonel Blotto is a universal game providing a way for resource allocation. See Fig. 6. 
The two colonels simultaneously distribute resources over battlefields. The player devot-
ing the most resources wins that battlefield. The payoff is equal to the total number of 
battlefields won.
Fig. 4 Cake cutting is a simple game in which first player has to cut the cake and second player will then 
choose any piece. This is game of fairness as if player cuts unequal pieces then other player has the option to 
choose either the bigger or smaller piece. Otherwise both players will get equal pieces 
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Roberson (2006) described the remarkable equilibrium payoffs in the Colonel Blotto 
game. It considers both symmetric and asymmetric cases of the zero-sum game. The 
proportion of won battlefields is the payoff of player.
Hart (2008) have studied Discrete Colonel Blotto game. This is a Zero-sum game with 
the symmetric case for which optimal strategy is obtained. Both of these games deal with 
the conflicting environment.
Kuhn Poker
Kuhn Poker is a simplified form of Poker developed by Harold W. Kuhn (Tucker 1959). 
In this 2-player game, the deck includes only three cards. One card is distributed to each 
player. The first player has to bet or pass then the second player may bet or pass. On a 
bet, the next player must bet also. When both players pass or bet then the player with 
the highest card will win the pot.
Southey et al. (2009) have studied Kuhn Poker game. There main concern is opponent 
modeling in the game. They studied two algorithms, expert and parameter estimation. 
Their experiment showed that learning methods do not give good results in the small 
game.
Princess Monster
Rufus Isaac formulated a game Princess Monster in his book “Differential Games” 
(Isaaks 1952). This is a Zero-sum game between two players, Princess and Monster. The 
game played on 2-D search set. See Fig. 7. When the distance between both players is 
less than r then Princess got captured and Monster wins.
Wilson (1972) has developed this game on a circle. Princess and Monster move on a 
circle either clockwise or anti-clockwise. If both players move in the same direction, the 
Fig. 5 Matching pennies is a simple zero-sum 2-player game. Both players turn their coins secretly and then 
show. If both coins are of same side (c, d) first player will win else second player will win both coins (a, b)
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game state does not change. But if they move in opposite directions then there will be 
a point on the circle on which both reach at the same time. At that point, Princess got 
captured and Monster wins.
Solution concepts
We have discussed before that game describes strategic interactions. In game theory, 
the solution concept is like a rule by which game theorists seeks how the game will be 
played. The Nash equilibrium, Pareto optimality, and Shapley values are different known 
solution concepts. These concepts are used to formally predict that how the game will be 
played.
Nash equilibrium of games
Nash (1951) defined Nash equilibrium. In the Nash equilibrium, all players know each 
other’s equilibrium strategy. And no utility a player can have by changing its own strat-
egy only. For example, there is a game battle of sexes (Shah et  al. 2012). The game is 
between husband and wife. Husband prefers to go for football match and wife wants to 
go for a concert. Also, they want to go together. The payoff table is shown in Table 2. The 
solution for the game can be either both go for a football match or go to a concert.
Singh and Hemachandra (2014) have studied Nash equilibrium for stochastic games 
with independent state processes. This study got basis from the work of Altman et al. 
2008. They worked on N-player Constrained Stochastic games.
Grauberger and Kimms (2014) have computed Nash equilibria for network revenue 
management games. This study investigates network management competition. A heu-
ristic is presented for computing Optimal Capacity allocations. It also computes Nash 
Fig. 6 Colonel Blotto is a resource allocation game. In this game the two colonels simultaneously distribute 
limited resources over several objects (or battlefields). The player devoting the most resources wins that bat-
tlefield, and the payoff is equal to the total number of battlefields won
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equilibria in non-zero-sum games. It computes approximate to exact Nash equilibrium. 
They used the linear continuous model to reduced computational time.
Gharesifard and Cortes (2013) have considered a network based scenario and obtained 
a Nash solution. Network’s aim is to maximize or minimize a common objective func-
tion. The two players are two network agents. They have their objectives to achieve net-
work’s aim. Both agents with opposite aims make a zero-sum game between them. Each 
network’s saddle-point dynamics implemented by both network’s through local interac-
tions. The saddle-point dynamics for concave-convex class converges to Nash equilib-
rium. This saddle-point dynamics do not work to converge directed networks.
Porter et  al. (2008) have proposed two search methods that calculate Nash equilib-
rium. One method is for the two-player game and the second method is for the n-player 
game. Both methods uses backtracking approaches to search the space of small and bal-
anced support. These methods are tested on different games. Results showed positive 
performance of these methods. Another approach the Lemke–Houson algorithm for 
two-player games also discussed here.
Rosenthal (1974) have obtained correlated equilibria for 2-player games. These are 
more general strategies than Nash equilibrium known as correlated equilibrium. There 
can be a player who prefers correlated equilibria on Nash equilibrium. If this so, then 
correlated equilibria is a convenient solution. If the game is the best response then the 
correlated equilibria are not the right solution. It is good for the competitive games.
Hu and Wellman (2003) have computed Nash equilibrium for the general-sum sto-
chastic game. They proposed a method for a multiagent Q-learning. The method Nash-Q 
Fig. 7 Princess Monster
Table 2 Payoff table of battle of sexes (Adapted from Shah et al. (2012))
Husband Wife
Football Music
 Footbal (3,1) (0,0)
 Music (0,0) (1,3)
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generalizes Q-learning of single-agent to the multiagent environment. It updates its 
Q-function by assuming Nash equilibrium actions as a choice of agents. It is shown that 
Nash Q provides efficiency to get equilibrium on single-agent Q-learning. This is an 
offline learning process. The online version of this learning process is also implemented.
Maeda (2003) have considered games that have fuzzy payoffs. They first characterize 
equilibrium strategies as Nash equilibrium strategies. Then they examine characteris-
tics of game values of fuzzy matrix games. Finally, they demonstrated this approach via 
numerical example.
Athey (2001) have studied games known as games of incomplete information. They 
proposed a restriction called single crossing condition (SCC) for these games. The Pure 
Strategy Nash equilibrium with a finite set of actions exists if SCC is satisfied. In these 
games, players have private information of their own. The results of this study show non-
decreasing Pure Strategy Nash equilibrium. The proposed approach is constructive. So 
that the equilibria can be calculated for finite action games easily.
Pareto optimality
Pareto optimality introduced by Vilfredo Pareto (Yeung 2006). In Pareto optimal game, 
there exists a strategy that increases player’s gain without damaging others. For exam-
ple, when Economy is competitive perfectly then it is Pareto optimal. This is because no 
changes in the Economy can make better the gain of one person and can make worse the 
gain of another person at the same time.
Feldman (1973) has discussed Pareto Optimality in bilateral barter. The proved the 
constraints under which trade moves go on to pairwise optimal allocation. Then this 
paper discussed some general conditions by which these allocations are Pareto optimal.
Kacem et  al. (2002) have solved the flexible job-shop scheduling problem.by using 
hybrid Pareto approach. Their proposed approach combines Fuzzy logic and evolution-
ary algorithms. This combination minimizes machine workloads and completion time.
Guesnerie (1975) have discussed insights of non-convex economics. The paper charac-
terizes Pareto-optimal states. Then analyze how to achieve them in distributed economy. 
The focus of this paper mainly concerns with conditions needed for optimality, marginal 
cost pricing rules, and decentralized non-convex economy.
Shapley values
There is a Shapley value another solution concept used in cooperative game theory 
(Shapely 1953). It allocates a distribution to all players in a game. The distribution is 
unique and the game value depends on some desirable abstract characteristics. In simple 
words, Shapley value assigns credit among a group of cooperating players. For example, 
there are three red, blue and green players. The red player cooperates more than blue 
and green players. The goal is to form a pair and then assign credits to them. Each pair 
must have a red player as it cooperates more than others. So there can be two possible 
pairs. The two pairs are:
1. Red player, blue player
2. Red player, green player.
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The red player cooperates more, so it will get more profit than player blue in the first 
pair. Similarly, it will get more profit than a green player in the second pair.
Littlechild and Owen (1973) discussed the problem of computing Shapley value for 
large games. They considered the work of Broker and Thompson of about aircraft land-
ing charges on the airport. This paper presents an expression that can be calculated 
when the cost function is a characteristics function. The costs of the biggest player in any 
subset of players is equal to the cost of that subset.
Gul (1989) has worked on the bargaining problem in a transferable utility economy. A 
framework is established by which the two approaches, cooperative and noncooperative, 
are compared. The stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is used and with small 
time intervals, the gain is the Shapley value for the agent.
Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001) have proposed a mechanism to analyze how 
cooperation produces surplus. It is a two-phased play. The first phase is of bidding that 
gives the winner of the game. In the second phase the winner is rejected then the game is 
again played without that winner. This paper describes that the payoff of the game coex-
ists with Shapley value.
Decision theory
Parsons and Wooldridge (2002) have discussed both game and decision theories. As 
game theory studies agent’s interaction, it is closed relative to decision theory. Decision 
theory seeks to get the most favorable choice. That can maximize utilities of decision 
makers. Whereas the game theory also studies self-interested agents. It takes agents as 
greedy players want to maximize their own gain. This paper reviewed existing literature. 
Then it revealed issues related to autonomous agents and multi-agent system.
Hart et al. (1994) have worked on the two-person zero-sum game. They obtained game 
value and derived utility simultaneously by using decision theory. They found the gap 
between the axioms and presumption about expected utility maximization. Axioms 
characterize expected utility maximization, considering risk, in the individual decision. 
The presumption is that expected utility maximizers evaluate the game by their value. 
This study does not fill this gap completely. Because rationality involves playing maximin 
strategies is not proved.
Game theory in computer science
Roughgarden (2010) have described Algorithmic Game Theory (AGT), a game theory 
applications in computer science. This paper explores current research formats in AGT. 
The research theme is different here than classical game theory. AGT receives the com-
putational difficulty as a coupling requirement which makes it unique.
Wooldridge (2012) have explored the feasibility of game theory applications in com-
puter science. They discussed issues related to the application of game theoretic models. 
They revealed the incorrect use of game theory model. They also mentioned that more 
research is needed in this area.
Ahmad and Luo (2006) have proposed an algorithm for video coding. It considers 
optimization of rate control. In this two-level algorithm, the first level is about the tar-
get bits allocation. In the second level, each MB computes to share bits fairly. So that its 
quantization scale can be optimized.
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Games in social systems
In this section, we will discuss game theory applications in social groups and others. In 
social groups, people interact and communicate each other. To model behaviors in such 
communication, game theory has been used.
Chen and Liu (2012) have modeled human behavior in social networks by using game 
theory. This is the study of the impact of social networks in our daily life. This gener-
alized approach can be used for several social networks. The efficiency and fairness 
between users are main considerations of the model design.
Hand (1986) has discussed social conflicts and social dominance. The social domi-
nance based on Leverage is considered here. There are personals having greater 
resources and personals having fewer resources as well. The paper describes that game 
theory can be used to make less dominant individuals equal or greater to others.
Markov games
Altman (1994) have used Markov games to control the flow of arriving packets. These 
are the collection of normal-form games that agents play repeatedly. These games 
together with a value iteration algorithm are used for single controller. The controller 
design policies to control the flow. Markov games is another name of stochastic games. 
This study reveals the existence of the stationary optimal policy.
Ghosh and Goswami (2008) have studied semi-Markov game. They first trans-
formed the model into the completely observed semi-Markov game. Then they worked 
and obtained saddle-point. They showed the existence of saddle-point but with some 
conditions.
Laraki et al. (2013) have discussed stochastic games, subgame perfect and Borel sets. 
It describes conditions for the existence of game value. With these conditions the player 
2 gets an optimal strategy for subgame perfect. The conditions described that payoff is a 
bounded function f. The function f is measurable and is lower semi-continuous.
Deshmukh and Winston (1978) have developed zero-sum model for product’s price 
setting in two firms. The model is based on some assumptions. That is the current price 
of product and market positions influenced future market positions. This provides a way 
to get balance benefits gained from price variations.
Sirbu (2014) has studied zero-sum games. The paper discussed stochastic differential 
game restricted to elementary strategies. The result shows the existence of value in a 
game with these strategies.
Pham and Zhang (2014) have studied 2-player zero-sum weak formulation game. The 
game discussed is Stochastic and Differential game. The game value is obtained by visoc-
sity solution. The paper showed the value of the game as a random process.
Hernandez-Hernandez et al. (2015) have studied Stochastic Differential Equation. The 
game is between controller called minimizer and stopper called maximizer. The control-
ler selects a finite-variation process. And the stopper selects time at which the game will 
stop. The study described that the obtained optimal strategies are not unique.
Oliu-Barton (2014) has worked on Finite Stochastic game. This is a zero-sum game. 
The paper proves the presence of value in the game. The aim of the study is to provide 
asymptotic behavior of strategies.
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Hamadène and Wang (2009) have studied Backward Stochastic Differential Equations. 
These equations have terms. Their resulted solution is also a stochastic or random pro-
cess. The paper presents a remarkable solution and showed the value in the game.
Shmaya (2006) have studied an interesting game with one informed player. It is a two-
player zero-sum game with stochastic signals. The value of the game is taken as a func-
tion of player one’s information structure. The properties of this function, examined, 
shows that every player has a positive value of information in zero-sum game.
Non‑zero‑sum game models
In non-zero-sum games, there exists a universally agreed solution. It means there is no 
single optimal solution as zero-sum games have. These games model cooperation instead 
of conflicts. There can be a win-win solution of game where everyone is a winner. The 
players can play a game while cooperating each other to achieve a common goal.
Sullivan and Purushotham (2011) have discussed a high-level summit on non-commu-
nicable disease (NCD). The summit held in New York on September 2011 in which they 
discussed cancer policies. The summit recognized cancer a first high-level disease. This 
paper critically examined these policies. It gives an alternative solution based on a non-
zero-sum game model for international cancer policy.
Bensoussan et  al. (2014) have worked on the non-zero-sum stochastic differential 
game. They modeled performance of two insurance companies. Each company is greedy 
to maximize its own utility. The surplus process modeled by a continuous-time Markov 
chain and an independent market-index process. The game solved by a dynamic pro-
gramming principle. It is also mentioned that the presented game can be extended to 
several directions.
Carlson and Wilson (2004) have considered failure in the management of U.S. national 
forest. At first, this seems a pure conflict between US National Forest Service and Envi-
ronmentalists. But in this paper, a non-zero-sum game theoretical model is developed. It 
examines the effects of these changes on outcomes. It is analyzed that some changes do 
not affect outcomes and some have potential impact.
Shenoy and Yu (1981) have studied partial conflict games. This study examines the 
reciprocative strategy to induce cooperation. Reciprocative behavior is defined as Non-
Zero-sum games. It describes conditions for cooperative behavior to give an optimal 
response to reciprocative behavior. The feasibility of playing reciprocative strategy is also 
determined. Finally, conditions are given for reciprocative strategy that results to Nash 
equilibrium.
Mussa (2002) have studied two monetary units, euro, and dollar. This article argues 
that there is a non-zero-sum game between both units. It defines euro beneficial for both 
the euro area itself and rest of the world. Euro effects world’s economy indirectly. It is 
described that euro and the dollar are co-equal monetary standards. And is beneficial to 
the United States, euro area itself and rest of the world.
Semsar-Kazerooni and Khorasani (2009) have studied multi-agent system that con-
siders cooperative game theory. The common goal of the multi-agent team is to have 
consensus. Consensus can be accomplished over a common value for the agent’s out-
put. This paper is a series of work. In this paper, a previously introduced strategy is used 
called semi-decentralized optimal control strategy.
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Khosravifar et  al. (2013) have used an agent-based game theoretic model to analyze 
web services. There is a distributed environment in which agent cooperates each other. 
The performance of agents is analyzed by using non-zero-sum model. The decision-
making process is also analyzed.
Radzik (1991) have obtained pure-strategy and Nash equilibrium for 2-player non-
zero-sum games. The payoff functions are upper semicontinuous. Agents are not allowed 
to interact each other in the model considers here. The optimality criterion dominant is 
the NE vector. This vector computes optimal actions of all players considering their pay-
off function. The paper emphasizes solutions in pure strategies.
Radzik (1993) have computed Nash equilibria for discontinuous two-person non-zero-
sum games. This study examines two classes of these games on the unit square. Here the 
payoff function of the first player is convex or concave in the first variable. This supposi-
tion combined with bounded payoff function entail the presence of Nash equilibria.
Games in networks
The networks provide an excellent way of communication as well as support for distrib-
uted environments. The Game theory models have their obvious applications in net-
work-based systems. The following papers use game theory to get optimal strategies for 
network problems.
Transport networks
Bell et  al. (2014) have proposed a game theoretic approach for modeling degradable 
transport networks. By this approach, hyperpaths are generated between population 
centers and depot locations. They used a case study in the province of China to facili-
tate the proposal. Optimal hyperpaths are defined by using mixed strategy Nash equi-
librium. Which give ultimate depot locations. These depot locations are found by using 
two forms of drop heuristic. These heuristics gives optimal solution except in one case. 
That is when the most appropriate location for only one rescue center is obtained.
Alpcan and Buchegger (2011) have studied vehicular networks. They examine security 
of network for the improvement of transportation. It is to provide optimal strategies to 
defend malicious threats. Three types of security games are studied here. When players 
knows the payoff matrices the game is a zero-sum. When they know approximate pay-
offs the game is a fuzzy game. When players do not know each other’s payoffs, strategies 
can be improved via fictitious play.
Network security and reliability
Perea and Puerto (2013) have used game theory approach in network security. The 
game is between the network operator and attacker. The operator establishes network 
to achieve some goals. While the attacker wants to place damages in the network. The 
optimal strategy for the operator is building a network. The optimal strategy for attacker 
is finding edges to be attacked. This paper revealed dynamic aspects of the game.
Bell (2003) has proposed a novel method to identify failure nodes. It is a two-player 
game between a router and virtual network tester. Router has to find a least-cost path, 
whereas network tester wants to increase trip-cost. The link in use are optimal for router 
and failure links are optimal for network tester. Network tester fails link to increase 
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trip-cost. So the given maximin method is to identify those links that threaten to 
network.
Kashyap et al. (2004) have modeled multiple-input/output fading channel communica-
tion problem as a Zero-sum game. The players, maximizer and minimizer, have mutual 
information. On both maximizer and minimizer there is total power constraint. They 
obtained saddle-point of the game. It is shown that minimizer has no need of channel 
input knowledge.
Wei et al. (2012) have applied game theoretic approach for a non-correlated jamming 
problem. In this problem jammer has a lack of information about actually transmitted 
signals. There is a Zero-sum game between transceiver pair and jammer in the parallel 
fading channel. This paper explored CSI and solved problems related to it. The study 
finds equilibrium based on pure strategy. The game model adopts frequency hopping to 
defend against jam threats.
Chen et al. (2013) have used the zero-sum game model to analyze the performance of 
system. The approach examines communication across cooperative and malicious relays. 
It also analyzes the impact of this communication. The malicious relays can jam the net-
work and they intentionally interrupt the system. The Nash equilibrium is determined to 
get optimal signaling strategies for cooperative relays.
Venkitasubramaniam and Tong (2012) have studied network communication. They 
used zero-sum game theoretic approach to provide anonymity. Optimizing anonym-
ity problem is a game between network designer and adversary. The model showed the 
presence of saddle-point. The approach obtained optimal strategies by using parallel 
Relay networks. It explores throughput tradeoffs in large networks.
Wang and Georgios (2008) have considered Jammer and Relay problem. They mod-
eled the problem between them as zero-sum mutual information game. By assuming 
source and destination being unaware optimal strategies are derived for both players. 
In non-fading scenario Linear Relay (LR) and Linear Jammer (LJ) are optimal strategies. 
In fading scenario, J cannot distinguish between Jamming and source signal. So the best 
strategy is to jam with Gaussian noise only. Here R forward with full power when jam 
link is worst. They derived optimal parameters on the basis of exact Nash equilibrium.
Zhao et al. (2008) have studied Wireless Mesh Networks. They used game theoretic 
approach for increasing performance of MAC protocols. This is an iterative game hav-
ing two steps. In the first step current state of the game is determined on each node. In 
a second step, the equilibrium strategy of the node is adjusted to the determined state 
of the game. The process is repeated till the desired performance is achieved. Finally, 
results are validated via simulation.
Larsson et  al. (2009) have studied signal processing and communications in a game 
theoretic way. They demonstrated basic concepts of conflicting and cooperative game 
theory through three examples of interference channel model. These are SISO IFC, 
MISO IFC, and MIMO IFC. For conflicting case the study is limited to Nash equilibrium 
and price of anarchy (PoA). The Price of anarchy gives cost measures that system paid to 
operate without cooperation.
Nguyen et  al. (2013) have used game theory to integrate distributed agent-based 
functions. They proposed an agent-based conceptual strategy. Which resolves the con-
flicting interests between product agents and network agents. The method is based on 
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cooperative game theory that integrates and solves conflicting interests. Finally, the 
approach is verified by simulation with two case studies. First is like micro grid example 
and the second is the more complex case.
Quer et al. (2013) have used game theoretic approach to study inter-network coopera-
tion. The scenario is about two ad hoc wireless networks. Both cooperates together to 
gain some benefits. Statistical correlation between local parameters and performance is 
computed by Bayesian networks method. Both networks share their nodes to achieve 
cooperation. Game theory is used in nodes selection process. The system level simulator 
is used to confirm results. Results showed that increase in performance can be achieved 
by accurate selection of nodes.
Spyridopoulos (2013) have modeled problem of cyber-attacks. For that, they used 
Zero-sum one-shot game theoretic model. Single-shot games are opposed to repeated 
games. These models can be used when cooperation cannot be possible among players. 
The study explored adjustments and ideal techniques for both assailant and keeper. The 
study revealed a solitary ideal method for the keeper. The ns2 network simulator is used 
for the simulation of the model.
Khouzani et al. (2012) have studied software-based operations against malware attack-
ers. Malware has to maximize the damage. And the network has to take robust defensive 
strategies against attacks. This makes the game a Zero-sum game. Simple robust defen-
sive strategies are shown via dynamic game formulation. Finally, performance is evalu-
ated through simulation.
Discrete‑time/continuous‑time
Ye et  al. (2013) have proposed a discrete-time Markov chain Parrondo’s model. They 
analyzed model theoretically and verified via simulation. One can realize rationality and 
adaptability from a macro level. They showed that agitating effect of rewiring is effective 
than the zero-sum game.
Al-Tamimi et  al. (2007) have proposed an algorithm for the solution of a zero-sum 
game. The algorithm provides a solution for Riccati equation. They discussed two 
schemes of programming. One is heuristic dynamic and second is dual. These schemes 
used for the solution of the value function and game costate.
Liu et  al. (2013) have proposed an algorithm based on finding approximate optimal 
controller. It is based on the class of discrete-time constrained systems. This iterative 
adaptive dynamic programming algorithm provides a solution for near-optimal control 
problem. The control scheme has three neural networks. These networks are taken as 
parametric structures to assist the proposed algorithm. This is described by two exam-
ples that showed the practicality and concurrence of the algorithm.
Wu and Luo (2013) have modeled H∞ state feedback control problem as the two-
person Zero-sum game. An algorithm is proposed for solving algebra rectaii equation. 
They developed two versions, offline and online. An offline version is a model-based 
approach. The online version is a model-free approach but partially. These approaches 
are validated through simulation.
Abu-Khalaf et al. (2008) have used policy iteration approach together with neural net-
works. They provide practical solution method for suboptimal control of constrained 
input systems. They modeled the problem as a continuous-time zero-sum game. The 
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study showed new results and creates a least-squares-based algorithm for a practical 
solution. The proposed algorithm is applied to the RTAC nonlinear benchmark problem.
Resource allocation
Zhou et al. (2011) have modeled energy allocation problem in two phased training-based 
transmission. The model is based on the zero-sum game between two phases. The two 
phases are training phase and transmission phase. This study is about optimal energy 
allocation between these two phases. The closed-form solutions are derived from jam-
mer’s view. The study proves the presence of NE for fixed training length. Finally, it dis-
cusses channel state information.
Tan et al. (2011) have discussed radio networks. They used game theory approach for 
fair sub-carriers allocation and power allocation. The sub-carrier allocation and power 
allocation are based on colonel blotto game. The secondary users allocate budget wisely 
to transmit power to win sub-carriers. Power allocation and budget allocation are strat-
egies used for fair sharing among secondary users. This paper proposed algorithms 
and conditions for the presence of unique NE. Finally, the results are validated through 
simulation.
Belmega et  al. (2009) have discussed power allocation in fast fading multiple access 
channels. In these channels transmitters and receiver have many antennas. The study 
gives unique Nash equilibrium. It also gives best power allocation policies. The paper 
discussed two different games. In the first game, the users can adapt their temporal 
power allocation to their decoding rank at the receiver. The other is to optimize their 
spatial power allocation between their transmit antennas. Finally, results are shown via 
simulation.
In the next section, we will classify games in tabular structures. Then will discuss some 
open problems.
Discussion
We discussed game theory and its applications in different domains by exploring differ-
ent papers. We described how game theory models strategic and complex interactions 
of self-interested agents. We also proposed a general taxonomy of games, based on the 
types of game representation. The three types of game representation are Normal-form, 
Extensive-form, and Beyond Normal/Extensive form. Then we classify games according 
to these representation types.
We have seen different games while reviewing literature. Such as Markov games, Zero-
sum game, Stochastic game, Bayesian games etc. These are actually different classes of 
games having different properties. We summarized different games, by their different 
types. See Table 3. The legend used in the table is summarized in Table 4.
We also summarized games discussed in different papers according to representation 
forms. The representation forms are Normal, Extensive and Beyond normal/extensive 
form. See Table 5.
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Open problems
We have noted   that while  researchers applied game theory in different domains, 
there is still need to further exploit game theory in the modeling of complex systems 
research.  In computer science, there is also a need to apply game theory in the domain 
of  resource allocation algorithms such as in clouds, Internet of Things, Cyber physical 
systems, and others.   Cake Cutting and Colonel Blotto are quite possibly   good game-
theoretic resource allocation models and can thus be used in such domains. However, 
they have not previously been used much in these areas. Furthermore, fair allocation is 
still a complex task in distributed systems. With the advent of mobile, pervasive comput-
ing, and cloud-based systems, practical distributed computing requires the resolution of 
such dilemmas on a regular basis.  In other words, there is a growing need to use game 
theory for practical applications in the technological domains rather than restrict it to 
purely theoretical applications and those too, limited to very specific and niche areas of 
research.
Another open area for further research is in the development of taxonomies for spe-
cific game theoretic areas. We have proposed a general taxonomy of games. We have also 
mentioned few previously defined taxonomies. However,  there is a need for the devel-
opment  of more taxonomies of games. These include the development of taxonomies 
and review of papers and games  such as in the domain of Bayesian games, Congestion 
games among others. 
Conclusions and future work
This paper presents a review of game theory models from the agent-based modeling per-
spective. We have discussed different  classes of games such as Zero-sum, Perfect infor-
mation, Bayesian, Congestion etc. We have also  explored the importance and nature of 
game theory by means of a novel taxonomy. The presented  taxonomy of game classes 
has been based on types of game representation. In the review, game theory applications 
in different fields has also been discussed. We believe that this review will help multidis-
cplinary researchers in expanding their knowledge about the state-of-the-art in game 
theory. In particular, it will help researchers to look at game-theoretic literature analyzed 
from the perspective of agents and complexity.
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Table 4 Legends used in Table 3
Legends Name
N Normal-form
E Extensive-form
B Beyond normal/extensive
Z Zero-sum
NZ Non-zero-sum
P Perfect
I Imperfect
Table 5 Games in different forms of representation
S. no Ref Games Normal Extensive Beyond N/E
1 Three-morph mating Sinervo and Lively (1996) Yes No No
2 Extended RPS Bahel and Haller (2013) Yes No No
3 Mod game Frey et al. (2013) No No Yes
4 Continuous RPS Neumann and Schuster (2007) Yes No No
5 Balls and bins Edmonds and Pruhs (2006) No No Yes
6 3-player MP McCabe (2000) No No Yes
7 Colonel Blotto Roberson (2006) No No Yes
8 Discrete colonel Blotto Hart (2008) No No Yes
9 PM on circle Wilson (1972) No No Yes
10 Kuhn Poker Southey et al. (2009) No Yes No
11 Flow control Altman (1994) No No Yes
12 Network revenue Grauberger and Kimms (2014) No No Yes
13 Railway network Perea and Puerto (2013) Yes No No
14 VANET security model Alpcan and Buchegger (2011) No No Yes
15 Anonymous networking Venkitasubramaniam and Tong 
(2012)
No No Yes
16 Jammer-relay Wang and Georgios (2008) No No Yes
17 Network-malware dynamic game Khouzani et al. (2012) No No Yes
18 Link A + game B Ye et al. (2013) No Yes No
19 E-D vs jammer Kashyap et al. (2004) No No Yes
20 Transmission security Chen et al. (2013) No No Yes
21 Average payoff Ghosh and Goswami (2008) No No Yes
22 Semicontinuous payoff Laraki et al. (2013) No No Yes
23 Symmetric game Duersch et al. (2012) Yes No No
24 Mixed-strategy Seo and Lee (2007) No No Yes
25 Mixed zero-sum Hamadène and Wang (2009) No No Yes
26 AGTCS2-player search Zoroa et al. (2012) No No Yes
27 Insurance games Bensoussan et al. (2014) No No Yes
28 Duopoly game Deshmukh and Wayne (1978) No No Yes
29 Web services Khosravifar et al. (2013) No No Yes
Page 28 of 31Farooqui and Niazi  Complex Adapt Syst Model  (2016) 4:13 
Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Received: 22 December 2015   Accepted: 6 July 2016
References
Abu-Khalaf M, Lewis FL, Huang J (2008) Neurodynamic programming and zero-sum games for constrained control 
systems. IEEE Trans Neural Netw 19(7):1243–1252
Ahmad I, Luo J (2006) On using game theory to optimize the rate control in video coding. IEEE Trans Circuits Syst Video 
Technol 16(2):209–219
Al-Tamimi A, Abu-Khalaf M, Lewis FL (2007) Adaptive critic designs for discrete-time zero-sum games with application to 
control. IEEE Trans Syst Man Cybern Part B Cybern 37(1):240–247
Al-Tamimi A, Lewis FL, Abu-Khalaf M (2007) Model-free q-learning designs for linear discrete-time zero-sum games with 
application to h-infinity control. Automatica 43(3):473–481
Alpcan T, Buchegger S (2011) Security games for vehicular networks. IEEE Trans Mobile Comput 10(2):280–290
Altman E (1994) Flow control using the theory of zero sum Markov games. IEEE Trans Autom Control 39(4):814–818
Altman E, Avrachenkov K, Bonneau N, Debbah M, El-Azouzi R, Menasche DS (2008) Constrained cost-coupled stochastic 
games with independent state processes. Oper Res Lett 36:160–164
Athey S (2001) Single crossing properties and the existence of pure strategy equilibria in games of incomplete informa-
tion. Econometrica 69(4):861–889
Aumann RF, Maschler M, Stearns RE (1995) Repeated games with incomplete information. MIT press, Cambridge
Bahel E, Haller H (2013) Cycles with undistinguished actions and extended rock-paper-scissors games. Econ Lett 
120(3):588–591
Batt C (1999) Rock, paper, scissors. Food Microbiol 16(1):1
Bell MGF (2003) The use of game theory to measure the vulnerability of stochastic networks. IEEE Trans Reliab 
52(1):63–68
Bell MGH, Fonzone A, Polyzoni C (2014) Depot location in degradable transport networks. Transp Res Part B Methodol 
66:148–161
Belmega EV, Lasaulce S, Debbah M (2009) Power allocation games for mimo multiple access channels with coordination. 
IEEE Trans Wirel Commun 8(6):3182–3192
Bensoussan A, Siu CC, Yam SCP, Yang H (2014) A class of non-zero-sum stochastic differential investment and reinsurance 
games. Automatica 50(8):2025–2037
Bettiol P, Cardaliaguet P, Quincampoix M (2006) Zero-sum state constrained differential games: existence of value for 
Bolza problem. Int J Game Theory 34(4):495–527
Böge W, Eisele T (1979) On solutions of Bayesian games. Int J Game Theory 8(4):193–215
Bonabeau E (2002) Agent-based modeling: methods and techniques for simulating human systems. Proc Natl Acad Sci 
USA 99(suppl 3):7280–7287
Bopardikar SD, Borri A, Hespanha JP, Prandini M, Di Benedetto MD (2013) Randomized sampling for large zero-sum 
games. Automatica 49(5):1184–1194
Carlson LJ, Wilson PI (2004) Beyond zero-sum: game theory and national forest management. Soc Sci J 41(4):637–650
Carmichael F (2005) A guide to game theory. Pearson Education, New York
Chang HS, Marcus SI (2003) Two-person zero-sum markov games: receding horizon approach. IEEE Trans Autom Control 
48(11):1951–1961
Chen YW, Larbani M (2006) Two-person zero-sum game approach for fuzzy multiple attribute decision making problems. 
Fuzzy Sets Syst 157(1):34–51
Chen Y, Liu KJ (2012) Understanding microeconomic behaviors in social networking: an engineering view. IEEE Signal 
Process Mag 29(2):53–64
Chen MH, Lin SC, Hong YW, Zhou X (2013) On cooperative and malicious behaviors in multirelay fading channels. IEEE 
Trans Inf Forensics Secur 8(7):1126–1139
Daskalakis C, Deckelbaum A, Kim A (2015) Near-optimal no-regret algorithms for zero-sum games. Games Econ Behav 
92:327–348
Deshmukh SD, Winston W (1978) A zero-sum stochastic game model of duopoly. Int J Game Theory 7(1):19–30
Dixit AK, Nalebuff BJ (1993) Thinking strategically: the competitive edge in business, politics, and everyday life. WW 
Norton & Company, New York City
Dixit AK, Skeath S (1999) Games of strategy. Norton, New York
Duersch P, Oechssler J, Schipper BC (2012) Pure strategy equilibria in symmetric two-player zero-sum games. Int J Game 
Theory 41(3):553–564
Edmonds J, Pruhs K (2006) Balanced allocations of cake. In: Null, IEEE, New York, p 623–634
Epstein JM (2008) Why model? J Artif Soc Soc Simul 11(4):12
Feldman AM (1973) Bilateral trading processes, pairwise optimality, and pareto optimality. Rev Econ Stud 40(4):463–473
Frey S, Goldstone RL, Szolnoki A (2013) Cyclic game dynamics driven by iterated reasoning. PloS one 8(2):e56416
Gawlitza TM, Seidl H, Adjé A, Gaubert S, Goubault É (2012) Abstract interpretation meets convex optimization. Journal 
Symb Comput 47(12):1416–1446
Geckil IK, Anderson PL (2009) Applied game theory and strategic behavior. CRC Press, Boca Raton
Gensbittel F (2014) Extensions of the cav (u) theorem for repeated games with incomplete information on one side. 
Math Oper Res 40(1):80–104
Page 29 of 31Farooqui and Niazi  Complex Adapt Syst Model  (2016) 4:13 
Gharesifard B, Cortes J (2013) Distributed convergence to Nash equilibria in two-network zero-sum games. Automatica 
49(6):1683–1692
Ghosh MK, Goswami A (2008) Partially observed semi-Markov zero-sum games with average payoff. J Math Anal Appl 
345(1):26–39
Grauberger W, Kimms A (2014) Computing approximate nash equilibria in general network revenue management 
games. Eur J Oper Res 237(3):1008–1020
Guesnerie R (1975) Pareto optimality in non-convex economies. Econom J Econom Soc 1–29
Gul F (1989) Bargaining foundations of shapley value. Econom J Econom Soc 81–95
Hamadène S, Wang H (2009) BSDEs with two RCLL reflecting obstacles driven by Brownian motion and poisson measure 
and a related mixed zero-sum game. Stoch Process Appl 119(9):2881–2912
Hand JL (1986) Resolution of social conflicts: dominance, egalitarianism, spheres of dominance, and game theory. Q Rev 
Biol 201–220
Hart S (2008) Discrete colonel blotto and general lotto games. Int J Game Theory 36(3–4):441–460
Hart S, Modica S, Schmeidler D (1994) A neo2 Bayesian foundation of the maxmin value for two-person zero-sum games. 
Int J Game Theory 23(4):347–358
Hellman Z (2013) Weakly rational expectations. J Math Econ 49(6):496–500
Hernandez-Hernandez D, Simon RS, Zervos M et al (2015) A zero-sum game between a singular stochastic controller and 
a discretionary stopper. Ann Appl Probab 25(1):46–80
Hofbauer J, Sigmund K (1998) Evolutionary games and population dynamics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Hu J, Wellman MP (2003) Nash q-learning for general-sum stochastic games. J Mach Learn Res 4:1039–1069
Hutton W (1996) The state we are in London: Vintage
Isaaks R (1952) A mathematical theory with applications to warfare and pursuit, control, and optimization. Wiley, New 
York
Kacem I, Hammadi S, Borne P (2002) Pareto-optimality approach for flexible job-shop scheduling problems: hybridization 
of evolutionary algorithms and fuzzy logic. Math Computers Simul 60(3):245–276
Kashyap A, Basar T, Srikant R (2004) Correlated jamming on MIMO Gaussian fading channels. IEEE Trans Inf Theory 
50(9):2119–2123
Khosravifar B, Bentahar J, Mizouni R, Otrok H, Mahsa Alishahi, Philippe Thiran (2013) Agent-based game-theoretic model 
for collaborative web services: decision making analysis. Expert Syst Appl 40(8):3207–3219
Khouzani MHR, Sarkar S, Altman E (2012) Saddle-point strategies in malware attack. IEEE J Sel Areas Commun 30(1):31–43
Kilgour DM, Fraser NM (1988) A taxonomy of all ordinal 2× 2 games. Theory Decis 24(2):99–117
Lansing JS (2003) Complex adaptive systems. Annu Rev Anthropol 183–204
Laraki R, Maitra AP, Sudderth WD (2013) Two-person zero-sum stochastic games with semicontinuous payoff. Dyn Games 
Appl 3(2):162–171
Larsson EG, Jorswieck EA, Lindblom J, Mochaourab R et al (2009) Game theory and the flat-fading gaussian interference 
channel. IEEE Signal Process Mag 26(5):18–27
Li D, Cruz JB (2009) Information, decision-making and deception in games. Decis Support Syst 47(4):518–527
Littlechild SC, Owen G (1973) A simple expression for the shapley value in a special case. Manag Sci 20(3):370–372
Liu D, Li H, Wang D (2013) Neural-network-based zero-sum game for discrete-time nonlinear systems via iterative adap-
tive dynamic programming algorithm. Neurocomputing 110:92–100
Maeda T (2003) On characterization of equilibrium strategy of two-person zero-sum games with fuzzy payoffs. Fuzzy Sets 
Syst 139(2):283–296
Marlow J, Peart DR (2014) Experimental reversal of soil acidification in a deciduous forest: implications for seedling perfor-
mance and changes in dominance of shade-tolerant species. For Ecol Manag 313:63–68
Mazalov V (2014) Mathematical game theory and applications. Wiley, New York
McCabe KA, Mukherji A, Runkle DE (2000) An experimental study of information and mixed-strategy play in the three-
person matching-pennies game. Econ Theory 15(2):421–462
McDaniel RR, Driebe DJ (2001) Complexity science and health care management. Adv Health Care Manag 2(S11):37
Méndez-Naya L (1996) Zero-sum continuous games with no compact support. Int J Game Theory 25(1):93–111
Mertens JF, Neyman A (1981) Stochastic games. Int J Game Theory 10(2):53–66
Mertens JF, Zamir S (1971) The value of two-person zero-sum repeated games with lack of information on both sides. Int 
J Game Theory 1(1):39–64
Mitchell M (2009) Complexity: a guided tour. Oxford University Press, New York
Morrow JD (1994) Game theory for political scientists. Princeton University Press, Princeton
Moulin H (1976) Extensions of two person zero sum games. J Math Anal Appl 55(2):490–508
Moulin H, Vial J-P (1978) Strategically zero-sum games: the class of games whose completely mixed equilibria cannot be 
improved upon. Int J Game Theory 7(3–4):201–221
Mussa M (2002) The euro versus the dollar: not a zero sum game. J Policy Model 24(4):361–372
Nash JF (1950) The bargaining problem. Econometrica 18(2):155–162
Nash J (1951) Non-cooperative games. Ann Math 286–295
Neumann G, Schuster S (2007) Continuous model for the rock-scissors-paper game between bacteriocin producing 
bacteria. J Math Biol 54(6):815–846
Nguyen PH, Kling WL, Ribeiro PF (2013) A game theory strategy to integrate distributed agent-based functions in smart 
grids. IEEE Trans Smart Grid 4(1):568–576
Niazi M, Hussain A (2011) Agent-based computing from multi-agent systems to agent-based models: a visual survey. 
Scientometrics 89(2):479–499
Niazi M, Hussain A et al (2011) A novel agent-based simulation framework for sensing in complex adaptive environ-
ments. IEEE Sens J 11(2):404–412
Niazi MA, Hussain A (2012) Cognitive agent-based computing-I: a unified framework for modeling complex adaptive 
systems using agent-based & complex network-based methods. Springer, Dordecht
Page 30 of 31Farooqui and Niazi  Complex Adapt Syst Model  (2016) 4:13 
Okamura K, Kanaoka T, Okada T, Tomita S (1984) Learning behavior of variable-structure stochastic automata in a three-
person zero-sum game. IEEE Trans Syst Man Cybern 6:924–932
Oliu-Barton M (2014) The asymptotic value in finite stochastic games. Math Oper Res 39(3):712–721
Parsons S, Wooldridge M (2002) Game theory and decision theory in multi-agent systems. Auton Agents Multiagent Syst 
5(3):243–254
Perea F, Puerto J (2013) Revisiting a game theoretic framework for the robust railway network design against intentional 
attacks. Eur J Oper Res 226(2):286–292
Pérez-Castrillo D, Wettstein D (2001) Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the shapley value. J Econ 
Theory 100(2):274–294
Pham T, Zhang J (2014) Two person zero-sum game in weak formulation and path dependent Bellman–Isaacs equation. 
SIAM J Control Optim 52(4):2090–2121
Ponssard J-P (1975) A note on the lp formulation of zero-sum sequential games with incomplete information. Int J Game 
Theory 4(1):1–5
Ponssard J-P (1976) On the subject of non optimal play in zero sum extensive games: “the trap phenomenon”. Int J Game 
Theory 5(2–3):107–115
Ponssard JP, Sorin S (1980) Some results on zero-sum games with incomplete information: the dependent case. Int J 
Game Theory 9(4):233–245
Porter R, Nudelman E, Shoham Y (2008) Simple search methods for finding a Nash equilibrium. Games Econ Behav 
63(2):642–662
Procaccia AD (2013) Cake cutting: not just child’s play. Commun ACM 56(7):78–87
Qing-Lai WEI, Zhang HG, Li-Li CUI (2009) Data-based optimal control for discrete-time zero-sum games of 2-d systems 
using adaptive critic designs. Acta Autom Sin 35(6):682–692
Quer G, Librino F, Canzian L, Badia L, Zorzi M (2013) Inter-network cooperation exploiting game theory and Bayesian 
networks. IEEE Trans Commun 61(10):4310–4321
Radzik T (1991) Pure-strategy ε-Nash equilibrium in two-person non-zero-sum games. Games Econ Behav 3(3):356–367
Radzik T (1993) Nash equilibria of discontinuous non-zero-sum two-person games. Int J Game Theory 21(4):429–437
Rapoport A, Guyer M (1978) A taxonomy of 2x2 games. Gen Syst 23:125–136
Roberson B (2006) The colonel blotto game. Econ Theory 29(1):1–24
Rosenthal RW (1973) A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Int J Game Theory 2(1):65–67
Rosenthal RW (1974) Correlated equilibria in some classes of two-person games. Int J Game Theory 3(3):119–128
Roughgarden T (2010) Algorithmic game theory. Commun ACM 53(7):78–86
Sauder DW, Geraniotis E (1994) Signal detection games with power constraints. IEEE Trans Inf Theory 40(3):795–807
Semsar-Kazerooni E, Khorasani K (2009) Multi-agent team cooperation: a game theory approach. Automatica 
45(10):2205–2213
Seo H, Lee D (2007) Temporal filtering of reward signals in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex during a mixed-strategy 
game. J Neurosci 27(31):8366–8377
Shah IA, Jan S, Khan I, Qamar S (2012) An overview of game theory and its applications in communication networks. Int J 
Multidiscip Sci Eng 3:5–11
Shapley LS (1953) A value for n-person games. Contrib Theory Games 2:307–317
Shenoy PP, Yu PL (1981) Inducing cooperation by reciprocative strategy in non-zero-sum games. J Math Anal Appl 
80(1):67–77
Shmaya E (2006) The value of information structures in zero-sum games with lack of information on one side. Int J Game 
Theory 34(2):155–165
Shoham Y, Leyton-Brown K (2008) Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations. Cambridge 
University Press, New York
Sinervo B, Lively CM (1996) The rock-paper-scissors game and the evolution of alternative male strategies. Nature 
380(6571):240–243
Singh VV, Hemachandra N (2014) A characterization of stationary Nash equilibria of constrained stochastic games with 
independent state processes. Oper Res Lett 42(1):48–52
Sirbu M (2014) On martingale problems with continuous-time mixing and values of zero-sum games without the Isaacs 
condition. SIAM J Control Optim 52(5):2877–2890
Socolar JES (2006) Nonlinear dynamical systems. In: Complex systems science in biomedicine. Springer, New York, pp 
115–140
Sorin S (2011) Zero-sum repeated games: recent advances and new links with differential games. Dyn Games Appl 
1(1):172–207
Southey F, Hoehn B, Holte RC (2009) Effective short-term opponent exploitation in simplified poker. Mach Learn 
74(2):159–189
Spyridopoulos T (2013) A game theoretic defence framework against DoS/DDoS cyber attacks. Comput Secur 38:39–50
Stein ND, Ozdaglar A, Parrilo PA (2010) Structure of extreme correlated equilibria: a zero-sum example and its implica-
tions. arXiv preprint arXiv:1002.0035
Sullivan R, Purushotham AD (2011) Avoiding the zero sum game in global cancer policy: beyond 2011 un high level sum-
mit. Eur J Cancer 47(16):2375–2380
Tan CK, Chuah TC, Tan SW (2011) Fair subcarrier and power allocation for multiuser orthogonal frequency-division multi-
ple access cognitive radio networks using a colonel Blotto game. IET Commun 5(11):1607–1618
Tucker AW (1959) Contributions to the theory of games, vol 4. Princeton University Press, Princeton
Venkitasubramaniam P, Tong L (2012) A game-theoretic approach to anonymous networking. IEEE/ACM Trans Netw 
20(3):892–905
Von Neumann J, Morgenstern O (1944) Theory of games and economic behavior. Princeton University Press, Princeton
Wang J, Chen F (2013) Feedback saddle point solution of counterterror measures and economic growth game. Oper Res 
Lett 41(6):706–709
Wang T, Georgios GB (2008) Mutual information jammer-relay games. IEEE Trans Inf Forensics Secur 3(2):290–303
Page 31 of 31Farooqui and Niazi  Complex Adapt Syst Model  (2016) 4:13 
Washburn AR (2003) Two-person zero-sum games. Springer, Berlin
Wei S, Kannan R, Chakravarthy V, Rangaswamy M (2012) Csi usage over parallel fading channels under jamming attacks: a 
game theory study. IEEE Trans Commun 60(4):1167–1175
Wilson DJ (1972) Isaacs’ princess and monster game on the circle. J Optim Theory Appl 9(4):265–288
Winsberg E (2001) Simulations, models, and theories: complex physical systems and their representations. Philos Sci 
68(3):S442–S454. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3080964
Wooldridge M (2009) An introduction to multiagent systems. Wiley, West Sussex
Wooldridge M (2012) Does game theory work? IEEE Intell Syst 27(6):76–80
Wu HN, Luo B (2013) Simultaneous policy update algorithms for learning the solution of linear continuous-time hinfin 
state feedback control. Inf Sci 222:472–485
Xu H, Mizukami K (1994) Linear-quadratic zero-sum differential games for generalized state space systems. IEEE Trans 
Autom Control 39(1):143–147
Ye Y, Lu NG, Cen YW (2013) The multi-agent Parrondo’s model based on the network evolution. Phys A Stat Mech Appl 
392(21):5414–5421
Yeung DWK, Petrosjan LA (2006) Cooperative stochastic differential games. Springer Science & Business Media, Berlin
Van Zandt T, Zhang K (2011) A theorem of the maximin and applications to Bayesian zero-sum games. Int J Game Theory 
40(2):289–308
Zhang X, Zhang H, Wang X, Luo Y (2011) A new iteration approach to solve a class of finite-horizon continuous-time 
nonaffine nonlinear zero-sum game. Int J Innov Comput Inf Control 7(2):597–608
Zhao L, Zhang J, Zhang H (2008) Using incompletely cooperative game theory in wireless mesh networks. IEEE Netw 
22(1):39–44
Zhou X, Niyato D, Hjørungnes A (2011) Optimizing training-based transmission against smart jamming. IEEE Trans Veh 
Technol 60(6):2644–2655
Zoroa N, Fernández-Sáez MJ, Zoroa P (2012) Patrolling a perimeter. Eur J Oper Res 222(3):571–582
